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Abstract
In recent years, several instances of political actors who created fake grassroots activity on the Internet 
have been uncovered. We propose to call such fake online grassroots activity digital astroturfing, and we 
define it as a form of manufactured, deceptive and strategic top-down activity on the Internet initiated by 
political actors that mimics bottom-up activity by autonomous individuals. The goal of this paper is to lay 
out a conceptual map of the phenomenon of digital astroturfing in politics. To that end, we introduce, first, 
a typology of digital astroturfing according to three dimensions (target, actor type, goals), and, second, the 
concept of digital astroturfing repertoires, the possible combinations of tools, venues and actions used in 
digital astroturfing efforts. Furthermore, we explore possible restrictive and incentivizing countermeasures 
against digital astroturfing. Finally, we discuss prospects for future research: Even though empirical re-
search on digital astroturfing is difficult, it is neither impossible nor futile.
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1 Introduction
Not long after the advent of the World 
Wide Web, there were high hopes that this 
new form of access to the Internet might 
prove a boon for democracy. Thanks to the 
World Wide Web, citizens could gain ac-
cess to politically relevant information far 
easier than ever before. Even more than 
that: The World Wide Web seemed to car-
ry the potential to make the elusive ideal 
of deliberative democracy a reality (or, at 
least, to make instances of deliberative 
democratic participation easier) (Buch-
stein, 1997; Dahlberg, 2001; Rheingold, 
1993). The positive force of the Internet, 
the hope went, would make democratic 
participation easier than ever and thus it 
would promote democratic values, even in 
non-democratic countries.
The rapid progress both of Internet 
penetration and of Internet-related tech-
nologies has created circumstances in 
which the democratic online revolution as 
envisioned in the World Wide Web’s early 
days could, in principle, take place. Access 
to the Internet is increasingly common 
even in relatively poor countries, and both 
the means for accessing the Internet as 
well as the ways in which users can access 
political information and engage in politi-
cal discourse have proliferated.
Of course, the World Wide Web has 
not produced the democratic utopia that 
some might initially have hoped for. But 
Internet has certainly had an impact on 
politics and, more specifically, on political 
discourse. Citizens do indeed seek politi-
cal information online and they do engage 
in new forms of digital political discourse. 
Unfortunately, the relative ease of engag-
ing in political discourse on the Internet 
makes it also relatively easy to undermine, 
or at least negatively affect, that very dis-
course. One perfidious way in which this 
can happen: Political actors can create 
online activity that seems like authentic 
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activity by regular citizens, when it is, in 
reality, anything but.
Online users who are not what they 
pretend to in order to ruse real people are 
the opposite of what is hoped for in the 
ideal of deliberative democracy. Fake on-
line users are not interested in participat-
ing in rational political discourse, but rath-
er in deliberately and actively skewing the 
discourse according to the goals they are 
pursuing. This is not an entirely new tool. 
So-called astroturfing, fake grassroots 
campaigns and organizations that are 
created and backed by political actors or 
businesses, have a long tradition (Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2004; Walker & Rea, 2014). Astro-
turfing on the Internet is more problemat-
ic than the traditional kind: Digital astro-
turfing is cheaper, has a greater scope, and 
is potentially much more effective than 
regular astroturfing.
1.1 A new era of political astroturfing
In the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, the National Intelligence Coun-
cil at the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence released a declassified version 
of an assessment of Russian state-spon-
sored activities during the election (Na-
tional Intelligence Council, 2017). In that 
report, the National Intelligence Council 
describes the Russian interference in the 
2016 election as a continuation of co-
vert influence campaigns that Russia and 
the Soviet Union were conducting in the 
past. However, the report also mentions 
the activities of the St. Petersburg-based 
“Internet Research Agency” as part of the 
Russian influence campaign. The Internet 
Research Agency is a state-sponsored on-
line astroturfing organization (Chen, 2015; 
MacFarquhar, 2018) specialized in creating 
and maintaining sock puppets, fake online 
personae that are mimicking regular users 
(Bu, Xia, & Wang, 2013). The astroturfing 
campaign conducted by the Internet Re-
search Agency was great in scope. In early 
2018, Twitter notified over 1.4 million of its 
US-based users that they had interacted 
with sock puppet accounts likely affiliated 
with the Internet Research Agency (Twitter 
PublicPolicy, 2018). But the campaign was 
also sophisticated, as evidenced by the 
persuasive power of some of sock puppets, 
such as the influential, yet fictitious “Jenna 
Abrams” (Colins & Cox, 2017). The astro-
turfing campaign of 2016 was so pervasive 
that it was proposed that the US create a 
military unit in order to defend from such 
campaigns (Hart & Klink, 2017).
Digital astroturfing is not limited to 
U.S. elections. Instances of digital astro-
turfing have been documented in many 
countries (Wooley, 2016). Astroturfing ef-
forts can be conducted by outside political 
actors, such as in the 2017 French election 
(Ferrara, 2017) or in the 2016 Brexit vote in 
the United Kingdom (Bastos and Mercea, 
2017 ; Llewellyn et al., 2018), or they can 
be campaigns of political actors within 
their own country, such as the systematic 
digital astroturfing strategy of China (King 
et al., 2017). Digital astroturfing is also not 
limited to manually curated sock puppets. 
For example, many digital astroturfing ef-
forts are conducted with automated bots, 
whereby computer software impersonates 
humans by acting and reacting in as “nat-
ural” ways as possible (Bessi & Ferrara, 
2016; Shao et al., 2017; Wooley, 2016).
1.2 The goal of this paper
The phenomenon of digital astroturfing 
is of obvious importance. Digital astro-
turfing represents an inherently deceptive 
political activity that is detrimental to the 
democratic discourse and to democratic 
decision-making. In view of this problem, 
the goal of this present paper is threefold. 
First, we want to define digital astro-
turfing in a generalized, universally ap-
plicable manner. Digital astroturfing is a 
complex political activity. Second, we pro-
pose a typology of different forms of digital 
astroturfing. That typology is based on the 
type of actor that is engaging in the astro-
turfing effort; the persuasion target that 
is to be affected by the astroturfing effort, 
and the goal that is pursued by the astro-
turfing effort. Third, we discuss possible 
countermeasures to either prevent digital 
astroturfing or to lessen its impact.
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2 A generalized definition of digital 
astroturfing in politics
In the previous section, we have provi-
sionally introduced digital astroturfing as 
a type of political online activity that pre-
tends to be the activity of individual, regu-
lar online users, when it is in fact activity 
created by political actors. Such a provi-
sional definition already describes the na-
ture of digital astroturfing to some degree, 
but it is derived from an intuitive inductive 
process of describing what different cases 
of digital astroturfing have in common. A 
more precise deductive definition is need-
ed in order to describe digital astroturfing 
in a generalized way, independent from 
specific singular occurrences of digital 
astroturfing. To that end, we propose the 
following definition:
Digital astroturfing is a form of manu-
factured, deceptive and strategic top-down 
activity on the Internet initiated by politi-
cal actors that mimics bottom-up activity 
by autonomous individuals.
In this definition, digital astroturfing 
as a form of political activity consists of 
five necessary conditions: It takes place on 
the Internet, it is initiated by political ac-
tors, it is manufactured, it is deceptive and 
it is strategic. Digital astroturfing is manu-
factured in that it is not an honest expres-
sion of autonomous individual opinions, 
but rather activity created to mimic hon-
est expression of autonomous individual 
opinions. It is deceptive, because the goal 
of digital astroturfing is to trick the target, 
usually the public at large (including in-
dividuals and small groups), into believ-
ing that the manufactured activity is real. 
It is strategic, because the political actors 
who engage in digital astroturfing pursue 
certain goals in doing so. This definition 
is relatively simple, but in simplicity, we 
believe, lies analytical clarity. So far, only 
few authors have attempted to define dig-
ital astroturfing. The most relevant such 
attempt is a recent conceptual study by 
Zhang, Carpenter, and Ko (2013). In that 
study, the authors define online astro-
turfing (the authors use the term online 
rather than digital astroturfing) as follows: 
“Therefore, we define online astroturfing 
as the dissemination of deceptive opinions 
by imposters posing as autonomous indi-
viduals on the Internet with the intention 
of promoting a specific agenda” (p. 3).
This definition is similar to the one 
we introduce in three respects. First, we 
have adopted the authors’ very apt no-
tion of “autonomous individuals” into our 
own definition because it describes very 
precisely what kind of deception is taking 
place. We expand the descriptive notion 
of autonomous individuals by contrasting 
bottom-up and top-down activity; auton-
omous individuals engage in bottom-up 
activity, and digital astroturfing is top-
down activity pretending to be bottom-up 
activity. Second, and this is nontrivial, the 
authors define digital astroturfing as an 
activity that is taking place on the Inter-
net. And third, they describe digital astro-
turfing as a deceptive activity. We agree 
with those three aspects as necessary 
conditions, but the definition lacks accu-
racy and generalizability. The definition 
is inaccurate because it implies that the 
relevant actors are the imposters posing 
as autonomous individuals. However, the 
truly relevant actors are not the imposters 
themselves, but rather the political actors 
initiating the astroturfing efforts. The im-
posters, such as, for example, the employ-
ees of the Internet Research Institute in St. 
Petersburg, are simply performing tasks 
on behalf of political actors; they are the 
means to an end. It is possible that in some 
cases, the actors who initiate the digital 
astroturfing in pursuit of some goals will 
also actively carry out the digital astroturf-
ing effort themselves. For example, a pol-
itician might himself create a number of 
fake Twitter accounts with which he would 
then follow his own, real account in order 
to feign popularity of his account. But even 
in such a scenario, the distinction between 
who initiates the digital astroturfing effort 
is clearly separate from how the digital as-
troturfing effort is actually performed. The 
origin of digital astroturfing lies with the 
political actors who pursue certain goals 
by engaging digital astroturfing, and the 
means of actually carrying out the digital 
astroturfing effort can be, and in many in-
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stances probably are, separate from those 
political actors.
Furthermore, the above definition by 
Zhang et al. (2013) is not fully generaliz-
able because it does not describe a general 
principle, but rather one empirical scenar-
io of digital astroturfing: Cases in which 
individuals create fake online personæ, 
the so-called sock puppets, in order to 
communicate certain points of view. While 
such a digital astroturfing scenario might 
be a very important one, it is not the only 
possible one as we will later point out in 
our typology.
2.1 The difference between regular 
astroturfing and digital astroturfing 
Ours is not the first study to tackle the 
phenomenon of digital astroturfing. How-
ever, in the previous section, we only dis-
cuss one definition of digital astroturfing 
from one recent study. We are not willing-
ly disregarding other definitions of digi-
tal astroturfing, but the status quo of the 
conceptual work on digital astroturfing is 
rather limited: Most studies that look at 
digital astroturfing do not operate with 
an explicit definition of digital astroturf-
ing, but they tend to extend the concept of 
regular astroturfing into the online realm 
instead. For example, Mackie (2009) de-
scribes astroturfing on the Internet in the 
following terms: “Astroturfing is the use of 
paid agents to create falsely the impres-
sion of popular sentiment (the grass roots 
are fake, thus the term astroturf, which 
is artificial grass)” (p. 32). Even though 
the author goes on to argue that and why 
the Internet is vulnerable to astroturfing, 
he does not propose a separate, explicit 
definition of astroturfing that is occurring 
on the Internet. This implies that astro-
turfing is astroturfing, no matter where it 
takes place. Furthermore, Mackie (2009) 
is only considering paid agents to be in-
dicative of astroturfing. We believe that 
unpaid agents can be involved in digital 
astroturfing as well, as in the case of sym-
pathizers who become involved in digital 
astroturfing because they honestly sup-
port a cause; we delve into this issue in the 
sections below. In a similar vein as Mackie 
(2009), Boulay (2012) explicitly addresses 
the potentials of digital astroturfing, but 
she operates with the definition of regular 
astroturfing: « L’astroturfing est une straté-
gie de communication dont la source est 
occultée et qui prétend, à tort, être d’ori-
gine citoyenne » (p. 201). 
Is a conceptual differentiation be-
tween regular and digital astroturfing, as 
indirectly proposed by our proposal of an 
explicit definition of digital astroturfing, 
reasonable given the fact that several au-
thors analyse digital astroturfing, but only 
apply a definition of regular astroturfing? 
We believe it is, because digital astroturf-
ing conceptually clearly differs from regu-
lar astroturfing. In our definition of digital 
astroturfing, we identify five necessary 
conditions: The activities take place on 
the Internet, they are initiated by political 
actors, and they are manufactured, decep-
tive and strategic. If digital astroturfing is 
to be understood simply as the extension 
of astroturfing onto the Internet, then four 
of these five criteria have to apply to reg-
ular astroturfing; obviously, regular astro-
turfing does not have to fulfil the condition 
of taking place on the Internet. However, 
regular astroturfing is not adequately de-
scribed by the remaining four necessary 
conditions. In regular astroturfing, some 
political actors are present, and those ac-
tors act strategically in that they pursue 
goals. But those actors are not necessari-
ly always initiating the activities, they are 
not necessarily directly manufacturing 
the activities, and they are not necessari-
ly deceitful about their involvement in the 
activities. Vergani (2014) makes this point 
clear by introducing the concept of grass-
roots orchestra, a situation where genuine 
grassroots activity takes place, but over 
time, political actors get involved in that 
genuine activity and they influence, if not 
usurp the grassroots activity in order to 
steer it in a direction beneficial to them-
selves. A recent prominent example of a 
grassroots orchestra is the Tea Party move-
ment in the United States: It seems that the 
Tea Party was an amalgamation of genuine 
grassroots activity with coordinating and 
mobilizing influence by political actors 
(Formisano, 2012).
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The distinction between regular and 
digital astroturfing, in summary, lies in 
the fact that digital astroturfing is a clearly 
demarcated dichotomous phenomenon, 
while regular astroturfing is not; in regu-
lar astroturfing, varying degrees of genu-
ine grassroots components can be pres-
ent. Of course, this conceptual difference 
between digital astroturfing and regular 
astroturfing does not preclude the possi-
bility that there are instances of astroturf 
campaigns where regular and digital astro-
turfing are combined in order to achieve as 
great an impact as possible (Walker, 2014).
2.2 A typology of digital astroturfing
With our generalized definition of digital 
astroturfing, it is possible to reflect upon 
what digital astroturfing can empirically 
look like. Because of the clandestine na-
ture of digital astroturfing, it could be very 
misleading to base a typology of digital 
astroturfing solely on the exposed cases of 
digital astroturfing, since there is no way 
of knowing whether those exposed cases, 
such as the briefly mentioned ones in the 
introduction, cover all possible types of 
digital astroturfing. For that reason, we opt 
for a theoretico-deductive typology of dig-
ital astroturfing: It is not possible to induc-
tively gather information on all instances 
of digital astroturfing, but it is possible to 
define a set of dimensions that will plau-
sibly exhaust the possible types of digital 
astroturfing.
We propose three dimensions that 
encompass the different possible types 
of digital astroturfing: The political actors 
who engage in digital astroturfing, the tar-
get of the digital astroturfing effort, and 
the goal of digital astroturfing. 
The first dimension of digital astro-
turfing types are the political actors who 
engage in digital astroturfing. It is reason-
able use the category of the political ac-
tors that engage in digital astroturfing as a 
starting point for a typology of digital as-
troturfing – after all, political actors are the 
conditio sine qua non of digital astroturf-
ing; political actors are the initiating force 
behind every digital astroturfing effort. We 
distinguish between five categories of po-
litical actors: governments, political par-
ties, interest groups, individual politicians, 
and individual citizens. The first two actor 
categories, governments and political par-
ties, are self-explanatory. The third actor 
category, interest groups, perhaps less so. 
We use the term interest group to mean a 
group that pursues political goals, but is 
neither part of the government nor a po-
litical party. This can include loose groups 
of like-minded people, nonprofit organi-
zations, businesses, and so forth. Interest 
groups are thus groups that pursue polit-
ical interests, and to that end, they inter-
act with the political system. Sometimes, 
interest group activity will be in the form 
of discrete, non-public direct interaction 
with members of government or parlia-
ment; i. e., in the form of lobbying. But in 
other situations, interest groups are advo-
cating their position publicly. The nature 
of interest groups can be very varied; typi-
cal examples of interest groups in Western 
countries are corporations as employer 
interest groups and unions as employee 
interest groups (Walker, 1983). In the con-
text of interest groups as political actors, 
it is important to keep in mind that digi-
tal astroturfing is concerned with political 
goals. There is a prominent phenomenon 
of non-political, strictly commercial qua-
si-astroturfing that some businesses en-
gage in: The practice of faking online con-
sumer reviews to make one’s products or 
services appear more popular than they 
actually are or to make competitors’ prod-
ucts or services appear less popular than 
they actually are (Yoo & Gretzel, 2009). 
This type of deceptive online activity by 
commercial interest groups is not digital 
astroturfing, because the nature of the ac-
tivity that the actors pursue is not political. 
If, however, a business is pursuing political 
goals and is engaging in digital astroturfing 
to that end, then we subsume that business 
in the interest group category of initiating 
political actors. The fourth category of 
political actors are individual politicians. 
Individual politicians are, for the most 
part, members of groups such as political 
parties, but there are situations in which 
individual politicians act on their own 
in terms of digital astroturfing. We men-
tioned one such scenario in the introduc-
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tion: A politician who, as part of his elec-
tion campaign, paid for Twitter followers.
The second dimension of digital as-
troturfing types is the persuasion target 
of digital astroturfing. We differentiate 
among two general persuasion targets, 
the public and specific political actors. It 
is quite obvious to imagine the general 
public as one target of digital astroturfing, 
since most known cases of digital astro-
turfing are cases of public digital astroturf-
ing activities. Of course, political actors 
can also perceive public digital astroturf-
ing and be affected by it. But another cate-
gory of digital astroturfing is possible, one 
that is specifically aimed at political actors 
and is not public.
The third dimension of the typology 
of digital astroturfing are the goals the po-
litical actors pursue by engaging in digital 
astroturfing. There are, of course, a myriad 
specific goals that specific political actors 
can pursue in specific political contexts. 
The idea of this third dimension of the dig-
ital astroturfing typology is not to describe 
every possible situational configuration, 
but rather to meaningfully divide the spec-
trum of the goals of digital astroturfing into 
a small number of categories. We identify 
two such categories of goals: support for 
or opposition to policy, and support for 
or opposition to political actors. We pro-
pose only two categories, since the goal 
of digital astroturfing is to communicate 
a valence either towards policy or towards 
political actors, and being positive or neg-
ative is simply the property of the valence. 
As for the objects of the valence, political 
actors who engage in digital astroturfing 
will either want to influence public opin-
ion or specific political actors with regard 
to certain policy issues, either to support 
their own position on those issues, or to 
oppose the position of other political ac-
tors. The other broad category of goals 
is support for or opposition to political 
actors. When political actors pursue this 
goal, they will either do so in order to feign 
public support for themselves, or to make 
other political actors appear unpopular. 
In public discussions of digital astro-
turfing, instances of digital astroturfing are 
sometimes described as trolling. To equate 
digital astroturfing with trolling in such a 
manner is a grave conceptual error. We 
have defined digital astroturfing as man-
ufactured, deceptive and strategic activity 
on the Internet initiated by political actors. 
Of these five necessary conditions, trolling 
only satisfies two: Trolling takes place on 
the Internet, and there is a strategic com-
ponent to it. However, trolling is not initi-
ated on behalf of political actors, it is not 
manufactured and it is only somewhat de-
ceptive. 
Trolling is best understood as mali-
cious, disruptive or disinhibited (Suler, 
2004) online behavior by individuals who 
engage in the activity of trolling of their 
own individual volition (Hardaker, 2010). 
Trolling often also appears as a social, 
coordinated activity (MacKinnon & Zuck-
erman, 2012). Still, conceptually, digital 
astroturfing is completely separate from 
trolling, and mixing these concepts should 
be avoided, not least because talking about 
digital astroturfing in terms of trolling trivi-
alizes digital astroturfing: Digital astroturf-
ing is a deceptive effort aimed at the public 
and launched by political actors. However, 
there is one potential connection between 
trolling and digital astroturfing: Cases of 
digital astroturfing in which the deceptive 
activity takes the form of trolling. In such 
cases, the trolling that is taking place is not 
authentic, but manufactured and strate-
gically used by political actors. We believe 
this conceptual distinction is important. 
Not every activity that is widely described 
as trolling is in fact trolling.
However, it is possible that political 
actors engage in digital astroturfing and 
the honest bottom-up activity they mim-
ic is trolling. This behavior can still be de-
scribed in terms of our typology, because 
a deceptive and strategic use of trolling 
is meant to disrupt some public debate 
and expression of opinion that a political 
actor objects to, and those public debates 
and expressions of opinion will, naturally, 
refer to some policy or to some political 
actors. Fake trolling thus has the goal of 
indirectly stymieing expressions of sup-
port for or criticism against policy or for 
political actors. For example, the Chinese 
government regularly tries to distract the 
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public and change the subject of critical 
discussions online with fabricated user 
comments (King et al., 2017).
Combining the three dimensions of 
the typology leads to the sixteen different 
types of digital astroturfing, as reported 
in Table 1, provide a useful framework for 
analyzing individual cases of digital astro-
turfing as well as for guiding expectations 
about digital astroturfing efforts in gen-
eral. Digital astroturfing can occur, as we 
argue in the introduction, in very different 
political contexts, and as a consequence, 
it can be challenging to analyze separate 
cases. With our typology, we provide, in 
essence, a useful heuristic – a way to think 
about digital astroturfing.
2.3 Digital astroturfing repertoires
Our typology consists of sixteen digital as-
troturfing scenarios that describe which 
actors pursue what kind of goal with their 
digital astroturfing efforts. However, the 
different scenarios do not automatically 
imply what specific measures the politi-
cal actors take in order to carry out their 
digital astroturfing efforts. These specif-
ic efforts consist of three elements: The 
specific digital astroturfing tools used, the 
specific venues where these tools are ap-
plied, and the specific actions that are tak-
en with those tools in those venues.
In social movement research, the 
concept of protest repertoires is used to 
describe which tools social movements 
use in which contexts (Della Porta, 2013; 
Tarrow, 2011). It is useful to use an analo-
gous concept for digital astroturfing: The 
concept of digital astroturfing repertoires. 
Digital astroturfing repertoires cannot be 
defined universally, because the tools and 
venues available for digital astroturfing are 
very much bound by time and space and 
are likely to change – just like the protest 
repertoires of social movements are bound 
by time and space and likely to change over 
time (Biggs, 2013). Also, describing digital 
astroturfing repertoires is ultimately an 
inductive task of continued observation of 
digital astroturfing cases. Even though we 
cannot specify a definitive and final list of 
context specific digital astroturfing reper-
toires, there are some typical repertoires, 
we believe, that encompass a large portion 
of contemporary digital astroturfing rep-
ertoires.
Digital astroturfing repertoires can be 
thought of, as mentioned above, as combi-
nations of tools, venues and actions. Some 
typical digital astroturfing tools are sock 
puppets, click farms, and sympathizers. 
Sock puppets are, as we describe in the in-
troduction, fake online personae (Bu et al., 
2013) that can be used for a variety of pur-
poses. Click farms are a relatively recent 
variant of sock puppets tied to the rise of 
social media. Click farms provide services 
that, essentially, boil down to faux social 
media activity, such as fake followers on 
Twitter or fake likes on Facebook (Clark, 
2015). Both sock puppets and click farms 
can contain various degrees of automa-
Table 1: Typology of digital astroturfing
Initiating political actor Persuasion target Goal: Support for or opposition to:
Policy Political actors
Government The Public 1 2
Political party 3 4
Individual politician 5 6
Interest group 7 8
Government Political actors 9  10
Political party  11  12
Individual politician  13  14
Interest group   15  16
Note. Each number represents one digital astroturfing scenario as a combination of three dimensions. Reading example: The digital astroturf-
ing type with the number 7 describes a digital astroturfing scenario in which an interest group has the goal of influencing the public opinion 
on some policy issue.
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tion through bots, programs that operate 
automatically on behalf of agents (Geer, 
2005). For example, fake user profiles used 
in click farms are usually created manual-
ly, but the accounts are subsequently op-
erated automatically. A lot of the current 
research in the area of digital astroturfing 
is focused on bots. Bots are certainly im-
portant, not least quantitatively, since 
creating and deploying bots is fairly easy 
and cheap. However, bots are still, for the 
most part, not able to persuasively mim-
ic humans (Stieglitz et al., 2017), limiting 
their potential persuasive power. Bots as 
automated sock puppets or as automat-
ed click farms are certainly important, 
but manually curated and operated sock 
puppets and click farm profiles still mat-
ter. The idea of sympathizers as digital as-
troturfing tools might, prima facie, seem 
a misclassification. After all, sympathiz-
ers are real people who honestly hold the 
opinions they put forward. The question 
whether sympathizers as digital astroturf-
ing tools honestly believe in what they do 
is conceptually irrelevant. Political actors 
are still orchestrating, i. e., manufacturing 
some activity that is supposed to look like 
non-manufactured, spontaneous activity; 
that activity is deceptive (the target of the 
astroturfing attempt has no knowledge of 
its manufactured origins); and the activi-
ty is strategic from the point of view of the 
political actor. Whether sympathizers as 
the tools of digital astroturfing sympathize 
with the political actors on whose behalf 
they act has no conceptual impact on the 
nature of the activity at hand. Howard 
(2006) describes such a case in which sym-
pathizers were mobilized in an orches-
trated attempt without even knowing that 
they were instrumentalized by a political 
actor. Finally, paid supporters are similar 
to sympathizers: They both engage in ac-
tivities on behalf of political actors without 
openly declaring so, and they both do so 
with their true identities rather than with 
sock puppets. However, paid supporters 
are not (only) acting out of personal con-
viction, but out of pecuniary interests – 
they are being paid for their activities.
Some typical venues of digital astro-
turfing are social media, websites, com-
ment sections (predominantly those of 
news websites), and emails. We under-
stand social media as platforms where 
users, be they individuals, groups or or-
ganizations, can connect with other users 
(Boyd & Ellison, 2007) and where the us-
ers themselves are the primary creators of 
content (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). Typical 
examples of social media are services such 
as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, 
and so forth. We also consider online pe-
titions to be a form of social media; after 
all, when signing online petitions, users 
connect with each other and by doing so 
create a certain type of content. Websites 
are separate from social media in that the 
users who curate websites do not simply 
create profiles on social media sites, but 
rather create separately hosted, indepen-
dent content. Comment sections are the 
sections on websites that allow website 
visitors to leave written comments below 
content on the website, and sometimes, 
to like or dislike existing comments. In the 
context of digital astroturfing, comment 
sections of news websites are potentially 
one of the most relevant venues. In prin-
ciple, comment sections could be thought 
of as just another form of social media, but 
we treat them as a separate venue. Users 
are the primary creators of content on so-
cial media, but not in comment sections 
of news websites – in comment sections, 
users only react to content created by jour-
nalists. The final venue of digital astroturf-
ing are direct messages. Describing direct 
messages (such as emails, online contact 
forms, private messages on social media, 
and so forth) as venues is perhaps some-
what confusing, because direct messages 
aren’t public places on the Internet. But 
what we mean by venue is not a public lo-
cation, but rather the place where the digi-
tal astroturfing tools are applied. However, 
direct messages are a somewhat special 
case of digital astroturfing, because direct 
messages can be targeted at specific polit-
ical actors, without the general public tak-
ing notice.
Finally, there are only two digital as-
troturfing actions: Actively creating con-
tent, or passively signaling (dis-)approv-
al. The difference between active content 
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creation and passive signaling of (dis-)ap-
proval can be exemplified with comment 
sections on websites. Writing a comment 
constitutes an active creation of content, 
whereas liking or disliking is merely a pas-
sive signaling of approval or disapproval. 
The different tools, the different venues 
and the different actions of digital astro-
turfing are summarized in Table 2.
A digital astroturfing repertoire may con-
sist of any combination of tools, venues 
and actions from Table 2. For example, 
the combination of sock puppets with 
comment sections (of news websites) and 
creating content is the digital astroturfing 
repertoire used by the Russian Internet 
Research Agency described in the intro-
duction. The combination of click farms 
with social media and the signaling of ap-
proval is the digital astroturfing repertoire 
used by the Swiss politician mentioned in 
the introduction who bought fake twitter 
followers. A repertoire consisting of sym-
pathizers combined with direct messages 
and creating content is a digital astroturf-
ing repertoire sometimes applied by polit-
ical candidates running for office who en-
courage sympathizers to send pre-written 
emails to friends and to newspaper editors 
(Klotz, 2007).
3 Countermeasures
Digital astroturfing is a clandestine activ-
ity, and as such, it is difficult to devise de-
fense mechanisms against it. While there 
is probably no way to completely prevent 
digital astroturfing from occurring, there 
are ways to limit the probability of digital 
astroturfing occurring or, at least, of dig-
ital astroturfing being effective in some 
venues. More specifically, we identify 
two broad strategies of countermeasures: 
Restrictive countermeasures and incen-
tivizing countermeasures. Restrictive 
countermeasures are measures that limit 
the spectrum of possible online activities, 
and this limitation of online activities in 
general also limits digital astroturfing ac-
tivities. Incentivizing countermeasures, in 
contrast, are measures that are conducive 
to honest forms of online activity. Incen-
tivizing countermeasures do not neces-
sarily prevent digital astroturfing, but by 
rewarding more openly honest activity, 
incentivizing countermeasures make dig-
ital astroturfing less prominent and thus, 
potentially, less impactful.
Before we delve into both types of 
countermeasures in more detail, it is in 
order to justify why exactly we propose 
countermeasures in the first place – the 
fact that we actively discuss countermea-
sures implies that we regard digital astro-
turfing to be a problem.
There are two major reasons why 
digital astroturfing is an important and 
problematic phenomenon, a normative 
one and an empirical one. Normatively, 
digital astroturfing is challenging because 
the act of engaging in digital astroturf-
ing, essentially, amounts to subterfuge, 
and subterfuge is nothing more than a 
form of lying (Grover, 1993). Empirically, 
digital astroturfing almost certainly has 
some real-world impact. While it is, for 
obvious reasons, very difficult to quantify 
the effects of digital astroturfing on pub-
lic opinion or on political actors, it is not 
far-fetched to assume that some effects 
are very likely to exist. If, for example, a 
user comment in the comment section of 
a news website is written by a sock pup-
pet, and some individual reads that com-
ment without realizing that it was written 
by a sock puppet, then the minimal effect 
of digital astroturfing has happened – 
someone was deceived by the digital as-
troturfing effort. The probability of such 
a minimal effect of digital astroturfing is 
very high; if the amount of people who get 
deceived by digital astroturfing efforts is 
greater than zero, then the minimal effect 
Table 2: Tools, venues and actions of digital 
astroturfing repertoires
Tools Venues Actions
sock puppets social media creating content
click farms websites signalling (dis-)
approval
sympathizers comment sections
paid supporters Direct messages
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exists, and consequently, digital astroturf-
ing has an empirical impact. What is not 
clear, however, is the full extent of the em-
pirical impacts of digital astroturfing. For 
example, there is some evidence that us-
er-generated comments on news articles 
can, in general, affect the perception of 
the content of those news articles (Ander-
son, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 
2014; Lee, 2012). It is entirely possible that 
astroturfed comments can produce simi-
lar effects.
3.1 Restrictive countermeasures, or: 
Limiting online activity
The most sweeping restrictive counter-
measure against digital astroturfing is be 
to outlaw it. However, an outright crimi-
nalization of digital astroturfing is, at the 
very least, hardly enforceable (digital as-
troturfing is, after all, clandestine). Also, 
digital astroturfing activities that do not 
use sock puppets but individuals who en-
gage in digital astroturfing activities with 
their real identities, would present a dif-
ficult legal situation: While the activity is 
clearly digital astroturfing (a political actor 
manufactures deceptive activity in order 
pursue his own goals), the individuals who 
represent the digital astroturfing tools can 
easily claim to honestly have the opinions 
that they express through their activities. 
Outlawing digital astroturfing thus seems 
very unrealistic. Furthermore, such action 
would potentially harm freedom of speech 
and thus, from a consequentialist point of 
view, do more harm than good (e. g., Deib-
ert et al., 2008). 
More realistic means of restrictive 
countermeasures are countermeasures 
applied at the different digital astroturfing 
venues as summarized in Table 2. But not 
all of the venues are suited for restrictive 
measures. Specifically, digital astroturfing 
can neither be meaningfully restricted 
when it comes to creating websites (it is 
trivially easy to create a website anony-
mously) nor when it comes to sending di-
rect messages, such as emails, to political 
actors. But for the other two venues, re-
strictive countermeasures can be imple-
mented.
The first of those venues is social me-
dia. One potential restrictive measure for 
social media is the detection of inauthen-
tic user accounts. There already exists con-
siderable research in the area of automat-
ed detection of fake social media accounts, 
usually in the context of spam accounts 
that post links to products and services 
or to other unrelated online content 
(Mukherjee, Liu, & Glance, 2012; Zheng, 
Zeng, Chen, Yu, & Rong, 2015). While there 
is some research that extends the question 
of automated detection of fake profiles 
to digital astroturfing (Chen et al., 2011), 
that research is still scarce. Another pos-
sible restrictive countermeasure for social 
media platforms is the implementation of 
a mandatory real-name policy for users. 
Implementing a mandatory real-name 
policy might sound drastic, but it has been 
the official policy of one of the largest so-
cial media platforms, Facebook, for years 
(Wauters, Donoso, & Lievens, 2014; Giles, 
2011). However, even though using one’s 
real name is the default policy at Facebook, 
not every user has to or is able to provide 
credentials for their identity. Facebook is 
detecting potential pseudonyms algorith-
mically and, apparently, selectively, which 
has led to instances of users accounts be-
ing blocked despite being honest expres-
sions of real identities (Dijck, 2013; Lingel 
& Golub, 2015). Mandatory real-name 
policies for social media also exist beyond 
Western social media platforms, notably 
in China. A prominent step towards ban-
ning anonymity on Chinese social media 
has been taken in 2011, when a manda-
tory real-name policy for so-called mi-
croblogging sites that are headquartered 
in Beijing, such as Sina Weibo, had been 
introduced. Under that policy, users have 
to register with their real identities, but are 
allowed to use nicknames on their public 
profiles. However, the policy has not yet 
been thoroughly enforced (Jiang, 2016).
The second digital astroturfing venue 
where restrictive countermeasures can be 
implemented with a high probability of 
the desired impact are comment sections 
on news websites. By and large, comment 
sections of news websites are already gov-
erned by some degree of restrictive mea-
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sures in that most news websites have 
some moderation policies in place (Can-
ter, 2013; Hille & Bakker, 2014). Comment 
moderation policies can be made more 
restrictive in order to prevent astroturfed 
comments. One restriction measure is to 
ban anonymous comments and enforce a 
real-name policy, similar to the social me-
dia examples cited above. From a logical 
point of view, banning anonymous com-
ments will always prevent sock puppets 
from commenting, which means that this 
measure is definitively effective, but only 
if it is systematically enforced by means of 
an explicit verification process.
Enforcing a real-name policy is not a 
viable restrictive countermeasure against 
all digital astroturfing tools listed in 
 Table 2: Paid supporters and sympathiz-
ers will still be able to be active on social 
media and to comment on news websites, 
since they do so with their real identity.
Another possible restrictive measure 
is not aimed at the tools used for digital 
astroturfing, but at the specific actions of 
digital astroturfing: Disabling the possi-
bility of signaling approval or disapprov-
al for existing comments through liking 
or disliking them. From a logical point of 
view, disabling the possibility of liking or 
disliking comments will always prevent 
this form of astroturfing. A third and most 
far-reaching restrictive measure with re-
gard to comments is to completely disable 
comments. A number of prominent news 
websites have opted for disabling their 
comment section in recent years (Finley, 
2015), but not primarily because of per-
ceived inauthentic commenters. Disabling 
comments will, from a logical point of 
view, always prevent all instances of astro-
turfed comments and, as a logical conse-
quence, it will always prevent all instances 
of astroturfed “liking” or “disliking” of ex-
isting comments as well. This means that 
completely disabling comments is the 
most effective restrictive measure against 
astroturfed comments, since it always pre-
vents 100% of astroturfing instances.
In summary, there are ways to imple-
ment restrictive countermeasures against 
digital astroturfing which are very likely 
to lead to the desired outcome, which is 
reducing or completely preventing in-
stances of digital astroturfing. However, 
implementing such restrictive measures 
can also have some downsides, and we 
believe that the benefit of reducing digital 
astroturfing by restrictive measures does 
not necessarily outweigh the downsides. 
When it comes to the automatic detection 
of unauthentic user profiles on social me-
dia platforms, the potential downside are 
primarily false positives: When automatic 
means of detecting and deleting inauthen-
tic user accounts are implemented, there 
is a chance that a portion of the accounts 
thus detected will actually be authentic 
ones. However, this downside of false pos-
itives can be actively controlled and dialed 
down. How many false positives there are 
is to a substantial degree a trade off with 
the desired sensitivity of the automatic de-
tection algorithms. If a maximum sensitiv-
ity is desired, meaning that a perfect rate 
of true positives is the goal, then the false 
positive rate will, probably, be at its high-
est. But if a lower sensitivity is accepted, 
meaning that not all true positives will be 
detected, then the false positive rate can 
be lowered.
The downsides of restrictive counter-
measures in comments sections on news 
websites are less open to adjustment than 
the downsides of automatic detection of 
inauthentic user accounts on social media. 
The first such measure we discuss above 
is enforcement of a real-name policy in 
the comment sections. Perhaps it is not 
self-evident why non-anonymity should 
have downsides at all – if one has an hon-
est opinion to publicly share, why not do 
so using their true identity? The problem 
with that notion is that in many non-dem-
ocratic countries, voicing one’s opinion 
publicly can have dire consequences. A 
prominent example of such a country is 
China, where online users criticize the 
government under the guise of anonymity 
because such criticism is essentially illegal 
(Qiang, 2011). Limiting the possibilities of 
anonymous online commenting in such 
political contexts will either lead to less 
expression of opinion, or to an increase in 
sanctions because those who speak out are 
easier to be tracked down. Another down-
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side of doing away with anonymous com-
menting is commercial in nature. Remov-
ing anonymous commenting reduces the 
total comment volume (Fredheim, Moore, 
& Naughton, 2015), but only a small part of 
those anonymous comments is likely to be 
astroturfed. This means that websites will 
lose a lot of user-generated content and, 
consequently, website traffic. This can ul-
timately lead to loss in revenue, which is 
a relevant factor for commercial operators 
of social media and of news websites.
The strongest measure with regard 
to comments on news websites that we 
discuss above is the complete disabling 
of comments. Completely removing the 
possibility for users to comment is a mea-
sure, we believe, that represents a step 
backwards in terms of the development of 
the Internet, because it is a measure that 
reduces the opportunities for honest citi-
zens to participate in public discourse. Of 
course, the Internet is a big place, and any 
one user can, for example, easily create a 
website to express whatever opinions he 
or she may hold. Furthermore, news orga-
nizations obviously have no obligation to 
host user-generated content (Jönsson & 
Örnebring, 2011) of any sort on their on-
line platforms. But the possibility for cit-
izens to directly react to news content by 
commenting on it and by engaging with 
other users who comment as well does 
seem like an added discursive value which 
is lost by disabling comments altogether.
Restrictive countermeasures against 
digital astroturfing are possible, but they 
carry with them some degree of down-
sides. Because of those downsides, it is 
worth exploring alternative strategies of 
countermeasures: Such countermeasures 
that do not restrict, but instead incentiv-
ize.
3.2 Incentivizing countermeasures, or: 
Rewarding honesty
The general idea behind incentivizing 
countermeasures against digital astro-
turfing is to provide incentives that moti-
vate users to behave in ways that are more 
likely to be honest. Incentivizing honest 
behavior does not prevent digital astro-
turfing from occurring, but by rewarding 
honest behavior, honest online activity 
can become publicly discernible from on-
line activity for which there is no informa-
tion about its authenticity.
One goal of such incentives is to en-
courage user participation under one’s 
true identity, without enforcing it. In the 
case of social media, encouraging users 
to use their true identity consists of two 
steps. First, there needs to be an actual 
possibility for users to verify their identity 
on a given social media platform. Second, 
after a user has verified his or her identity, 
the information of the authenticity of the 
social media profile in question needs to 
be publicly visible. Some prominent social 
media platforms, such as Twitter and Face-
book, have such a verification program in 
place, and verified accounts are awarded 
with a publicly visible badge. However, 
both Twitter and Facebook do not current-
ly implement their verification scheme 
widely for their whole user base, but only 
to a relatively small portion of users who 
are a “public figure, media company or 
brand” (Facebook, 2015). We believe that 
users can be incentivized to opt into a ver-
ification process by nudging them towards 
it. Users can be presented with advantages 
of a verified account, such as the pro-so-
cial norm of transparency and authentici-
ty, but also with the rather playful element 
of receiving a badge that is proof of their 
verified status. However, such nudging 
strategies are, to a certain degree, paternal-
istic in nature (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). 
We think that the paternalistic element of 
verification options should be minimized 
by explicitly presenting verification as a 
choice that brings with it certain benefits. 
User verification is also possible for 
the venue of comment sections. Besides 
identity verification, another type of veri-
fication is possible for comment sections: 
Incentives that allow for anonymous com-
menting, but reward a history of good and 
consistent commenting behavior. One 
such scheme is currently applied by the 
New York Times, where some comment-
ers are algorithmically selected for a pub-
licly visible verification badge based on 
their commenting history (Sullivan, 2014). 
Commenters become eligible for verifica-
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tion if they have not run afoul of comment 
moderators in the past. The main incen-
tive under that scheme is that verified 
commenters are able to immediately get 
their comments published, without prior 
moderation.
In comparison with restrictive 
countermeasures, incentivizing ones have 
the great advantage that they do not limit 
the spectrum of online activities, but rath-
er expand it by offering rewards for behav-
ior that is more likely to be honest. Howev-
er, incentivizing countermeasures against 
digital astroturfing are not without down-
sides. One major downside is the tempo-
ral component of incentivization: It takes 
time, first, to implement incentives, and 
second, for a critical part of a given user 
base to react to incentives. For example, 
if Twitter and Facebook decided to offer 
verification to all of their users, that would 
pose a non-trivial technical challenge, and 
the widespread adoption of verification 
would probably not be immediate but 
rather follow adoption rates and patterns 
similar those of other technological inno-
vations (Rogers, 2003).
4 Conclusion: Is research on digital 
astroturfing feasible?
Laying out a conceptual map of digital 
astroturfing is only a means to an end – 
a map is meant to be used to explore. We 
have described a typology with ideal-types 
(Weber, 1922). In the real world, no two 
instances of digital astroturfing will be ex-
actly the same, and they might employ any 
mix of astroturfing repertoires. Still, the 
map that we propose, even though prelim-
inary and likely incomplete, should be of 
some use for maneuvering the terrain of 
digital astroturfing. But how exactly can 
digital astroturfing be explored empirical-
ly? After all, digital astroturfing is a clan-
destine activity, and if it is carried out suc-
cessfully, we do not know that it has taken 
place. This makes any kind of research 
inherently challenging. For example, re-
search designs that are routinely used in 
the study of other forms of political com-
munication can be impossible to imple-
ment in the study of digital astroturfing, 
since very basic facts such as who is doing 
what in the pursuit of which strategic goals 
is, by definition, absent in digital astroturf-
ing. Even though it undoubtedly poses 
unique challenges, the empirical study of 
digital astroturfing is not futile. 
A first step in the study of digital as-
troturfing is the establishment of a plau-
sible conceptual framework of digital 
astroturfing. The very goal of our study is 
to contribute to this first step. In order to 
conduct empirical research, we first need 
a sound understanding of how to think 
about our object of study. In this sense, we 
do not think that research on digital astro-
turfing should be exploratory in nature, 
as is sometimes suggested for research on 
regular astroturfing (Boulay, 2013).
Some important recent research ef-
forts in the area of digital astroturfing are 
focusing on so-called “social bots” (Bas-
tos and Mercea, 2017; Ferrara et al., 2016; 
Woolley, 2016;). Social bots represent one 
digital astroturfing tool (automated sock-
puppets) used within one venue (social 
media). As such, they most certainly war-
rant scientific scrutiny. However, it is im-
portant to note that social bots probably 
represent the low hanging fruit of digital 
astroturfing. Social bots are a relatively 
crude form of digital astroturfing, and be-
cause of their highly automated nature, 
they are relatively easy to detect. Further-
more, and perhaps just as importantly, the 
less sophisticated a digital astroturfing ef-
fort, the less probable it is that the effort 
will have the impact intended by the initi-
ating actor behind the digital astroturfing 
effort. Not only could there be no effect, 
but there could actually be a negative ef-
fect (from the point of view of the initiat-
ing actor): When people become aware 
of persuasion attempts and thus develop 
persuasion knowledge, they tend not only 
to not be persuaded, but to actually react 
negatively (Friestad & Wright, 1994).
There are several empirical research 
strategies that can be applied to the study 
of digital astroturfing. A very important 
one are case studies. To date, most re-
search on cases of digital astroturfing is 
done by investigative journalists. Such 
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journalistic work is, of course, very valu-
able, but a more scientifically vigorous 
analysis of digital astroturfing cases is still 
necessary, not least because of the need 
to ground case study research in a sound 
conceptual framework. An obvious dis-
advantage of case studies is the fact that 
the cases that can be analyzed cannot 
be freely selected – only those instances 
of digital astroturfing that have been re-
vealed to be digital astroturfing are avail-
able for case study analysis. This a priori 
selection could potentially introduce bias, 
because observed digital astroturfing is 
perhaps different from unobserved digital 
astroturfing. However, this potential bias 
is not an insurmountable problem. Giv-
en a conceptual foundation that consists, 
among other things, of a typology and a 
reasonable expectation of digital astro-
turfing repertoires, the potential selection 
bias in case study research can be actively 
addressed. For example, if case study re-
search consistently failed to identify a cer-
tain type of digital astroturfing that could 
indicate that that type of digital astroturf-
ing is very successful at remaining hidden.
Another possible research strategy 
consists of surveys and interviews of polit-
ical actors. It might seem naive to suggest 
to simply ask political actors whether they 
engage in digital astroturfing. However, it 
is not at all unheard of for political actors to 
disclose sensitive information for scientif-
ic purposes as long as they are guaranteed 
anonymity. But talking to political actors 
about digital astroturfing does not have 
to produce a direct “admission of guilt” 
to be useful. For example, the perception 
of digital astroturfing by political actors is 
valuable data, because it could indicate 
how prevalent a phenomenon digital as-
troturfing is. Talking to people who are 
potentially involved in or knowledgeable 
about digital astroturfing does not have to 
be limited to political actors. Communica-
tion professionals in the business of politi-
cal consulting are also willing to talk about 
their line of work, given a sufficient layer of 
anonymity (e. g., Serazio, 2014).
A third promising research strategy 
is the direct collaboration with venues of 
digital astroturfing. Two of the venues that 
are summarized in Table 2 are suitable for 
this, social media services and news orga-
nizations that have comment sections on 
their websites. Both social media services 
and news organizations should, in princi-
ple, be interested in reducing, or at least in 
understanding digital astroturfing on their 
respective platforms. The specific nature 
of the collaboration can be twofold. First, 
the combined effort of researchers and 
operators of social media or of news plat-
forms can be focused on the detection of 
digital astroturfing. The second possible 
kind of collaboration is the implementa-
tion and monitoring of countermeasures 
against digital astroturfing. For this kind 
of collaboration, greater weight should 
be given to the implementation of incen-
tivizing countermeasures than to restric-
tive ones. Restrictive countermeasures 
are mostly a technical affair with poten-
tially big downsides, while incentivizing 
countermeasures involve not only tech-
nical innovation, but observation of and 
interaction with users as well. Restrictive 
countermeasures carry the promise of 
relatively fast short-term solutions, but in 
order to effectively combat digital astro-
turfing in the long term, we believe that 
innovations in the form of incentivizing 
countermeasures are inevitable.
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